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Abstract
In this paper, we focus on a speci¯c component of economically rel-
evant trust, i.e. on what we call `institutionally produced generalized
trust', de¯ned as the amount of widespread trust (which is a public good
for the economic system as a whole) endogenously and continuously gen-
erated by the interaction of two types of private organizations operating
in the economy: for-pro¯t ¯rms and nonpro¯t organizations. Through an
evolutionary model with a trust accumulation equation and two replicator
equations (capturing the evolution of economic organizations over time)
we show that (1) The ¯xed point where all the four sub-types of private
organizations considered in the model are simultaneously present can be
attractive only if `virtuous' for-pro¯ts (i.e. socially responsible ¯rms) and
`virtuous' nonpro¯ts (i.e. actually trustworthy mission-oriented organiza-
tions) generate a negative externality on the other organizations of the
same type. (2) The ¯xed point where the level of trust is very low and
no socially responsible ¯rms neither trustworthy organizations are present
can be attractive; this social con¯guration interestingly recalls, to some
extent, what some prominent social scientists depict as a trend currently
occurring in the United States. (3) A socio-economic scenario where four
pure population ¯xed points are simultaneously attractive exists.
1 Introduction
Is trust an economically relevant resource? Insofar as we properly de¯ne the
boundaries of this notion, it would be hardly deniable that a long-standing, rich
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1tradition in both economics and sociology invites us to provide a positive answer
to such a question. Though we often tend to take it for granted, any market
economy, regardless of its degree of inner complexity, calls for a relatively high
amount of trust in order to be sustainable over time. Trust, this line of thought
seems to observe, can be compared to the oxygen we breathe: we tend to take its
presence for granted and to get aware of its key role in our daily life only if, for
some reasons, its level suddenly decreases and we are prevented from breathing
as naturally as before. In order to gain more insight with regard to this critical
notion, we claim it is useful to begin by focusing on some of the most interest-
ing economic and sociological studies exploring a form of non-material capital
such as social capital and its relationships with relevant economic variables.
Social capital is often assumed to be accumulated via social participation activ-
ities, where `consumption' and `investment' in relational goods tend to coincide
(unlike what happens with regard to more standard forms of capital, such as
physical capital, where consumption and investment are both logically and tem-
porally distinct activities). Several authors directly de¯ne social capital in terms
of trust. Paldam and Svendsen (2002), for example, identify social capital with
\the density of trust within a group". A similar view is the one advanced by
Fukuyama (1995a, b), where trust is seen as a key factor determining the indus-
trial structure of a given economic system. Analogously, according to Putnam
et al. (1993): \ ...social capital... refers to features of social organization, such
as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the e±ciency of society...".1
On the same vein, Bowles and Gintis (2002) claim that \Social capital generally
refers to trust, concern for one's associates, a willingness to live by the norms
of one's community and to punish those who do not". Putnam (2000) asserts
that \The touchstone of social capital is the principle of generalized reciprocity
{ I'll do this for you now, without expecting anything immediately in return
and perhaps without even knowing you, con¯dent that down the road you or
someone else will return the favour". As Sacco, Vanin and Zamagni (2004) re-
mark, \The basic reason why \a society that relies on generalized reciprocity is
more e±cient than a distrustful society" (p. 135) is that it saves on considerable
transaction costs. Of course, trusting others is e±cient only if they are trustwor-
thy: \Generalized reciprocity is a community asset, but generalized gullibility
is not. Trustworthiness, not simply trust, is the key ingredient". In the light
of these de¯nitions, a ¯rst important point is the following: social capital is an
economically bene¯cial resource insofar as we de¯ne it in terms of generalized
trust. In other words, trust must be su±ciently widespread within a given so-
ciety in order to display positive e®ects not only at relational level, by directly
improving the quality of interpersonal relationships, but also at economic level,
1Putnam (2000) sees social capital as \... connections among individuals { social networks
and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them". Fukuyama (1997)
a±rms that \Social capital can be de¯ned simply as the existence of a certain set of informal
rules or norms shared among members of a group that permits cooperation among them. The
sharing of values and norms does not in itself produce social capital, because the values may
be the wrong ones... The norms that produce social capital... must substantively include
virtues like truth-telling, the meeting of obligations, and reciprocity".
2by making the market mechanisms more e±cient. As far as this idea of general-
ized trust is concerned, Putnam (2000) introduces the speci¯c notion of bridging
social capital, by opposing this type of social capital to so called bonding social
capital. While bridging social capital has to do with anonymous relations at
society-wide level, bonding social capital is group-speci¯c and, for this reason,
less relevant for (if not detrimental to) the functioning of market forces. Such
distinction seems to recall Granovetter's (1973) well-known contribution on the
`strength of weak ties', where he shows that while strong ties can signi¯cantly
contribute to enhance people's well-being, weak ties are likely to be more crucial
with regard to economic development, as they let people belonging to di®erent
social groups trust each other, by exchanging information at a higher level than
family networks or small (formal or informal) groups. As he explicitly observes,
\No strong tie is a bridge ... Whatever is to be di®used can reach a larger
number of people, and travel greater social distance ... when passed through
weak ties rather than strong" (Granovetter 1973).
The long series of quotations reported above indicates that the generaliza-
tion of trusting behaviors at societal level (that is, in Putnam's terminology, the
accumulation of bridging social capital) seems to play a key role in promoting
economic development. In recent years, as far as the relationship between trust
and relevant economic indicators is concerned, an important empirical analysis
is the one carried out at international level by Knack and Keefer (1997). The
two authors assess the impact on economic growth of trust, civic norms and
associational activity by means of data from the World Value Survey for 29
market economies between 1981 and 1991. The two variables utilized in that
study (TRUST and CIVIC) turned out to be highly positively correlated one
to the other and \both of them are designed to capture generalized trust and
cooperative attitudes, rather than social capital at the level of a speci¯c group.
Therefore, we can consider them as indicators of society-wide relational orien-
tation" (Sacco, Vanin and Zamagni 2004). In their contribution, Knack and
Keefer ¯nd a strong correlation between trust and civic association on the one
hand and economic performance on the other hand. But this work is interesting
also for another result they obtain: by focusing on the density of horizontal net-
works in a society (GROUPS), they discover that associational activity is not
correlated with economic performance. Therefore, though it remains largely
unclear what the origin of trust is, it seems di±cult to explain its emergence
with reference to associational activity only, due to the observed correlation be-
tween trust and economic growth. It is then probably worth exploring whether
trust can be generated and sustained over time through the action of formal,
organized institutions, rather than via informal channels with low levels of in-
ner organization. This direction of research recalls, to some extent, Knack and
Keefer's (1997) ¯nding that \trust and norms of civic cooperation are stronger in
countries with formal institutions that e®ectively protect property and contract
rights". Speci¯cally, we decided to focus on a special form of generalized trust,
namely the one generated by the market economy itself as an external e®ect of
the dynamic interaction taking place between the two types of private organi-
zations operating within contemporary, advanced economic systems: for-pro¯t
3¯rms and nonpro¯t organizations. As we will clarify in Section 2, economic
organizations' objective functions directly depend on the amount of generalized
trust available in the economy as a whole. More speci¯cally, in some of the
scenarios explored within the context of the evolutionary model illustrated in
the following sections, it is assumed that the overall amount of trust is posi-
tively a®ected by both the proportion of `true', genuine nonpro¯t organizations
(NPOs) and the proportion of (suitably de¯ned) `socially responsible' for-pro¯t
¯rms (FPOs). Since the type of trust we take into account in our analysis is
a relatively speci¯c (though a crucial) one, we claim that this is equivalent to
analyze a form of bridging social capital which can be labelled `institutionally
produced generalized trust', as it represents the speci¯c component of gener-
alized trust produced by the dynamic interaction occurring between nonpro¯t
and for-pro¯t organizations over time. It is then the case that in this model we
do not study the emergence of generalized trust as a whole, but the relatively
speci¯c but certainly important component of it emerging through formal, eco-
nomically signi¯cant channels. The structure of the remainder of the paper is
the following. Section 2 sheds light on the basic features of the evolutionary
model. Section 3 illustrates the social dynamics. Section 4 contains analytical
results. Section 5 explores three signi¯cant contexts where di®erent assumptions
are made as to `trust producers' and `trust consumers'. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Besley and Ghatak (2003) draw a distinction which is similar to the one drawn
in this paper: \We benchmark the behavior of the mission-oriented part of the
economy against a `pro¯t-oriented' sector where standard economic assumptions
are made { pro¯t seeking and no non-pecuniary agent motivation". As we
speci¯ed above, we consider it important in our model not only to distinguish
between for-pro¯t ¯rms (FPOs) and nonpro¯t organizations (NPOs), but also
to draw a further distinction by considering the possibility to observe truly
`trustworthy' and `isomorphic' organizations in the nonpro¯t sector as well as
`pure' and `socially responsible' ¯rms within the for-pro¯t sector. On the one
hand, as far as for-pro¯t ¯rms are concerned, such pro¯t-oriented organizations
can either be classic, `pure' for-pro¯t actors, totally committed to the pursuit
of the highest possible level of pro¯ts, or for-pro¯t ¯rms choosing to adopt
a socially responsible pro¯le, i.e. opting for the so called `Corporate Social
Responsibility' (CSR). What does it exactly mean, for a private organization, to
be `socially responsible' (while preserving its ultimately pro¯t-oriented pro¯le)?
CSR can take many forms, as con¯rmed by an intense debate currently going on
all over the world, but the basic point can be summarized as follows: a socially
responsible ¯rm is a pro¯t-oriented ¯rm which decided to systematically pursue,
together with the usual pro¯t maximization goal, some well-targeted socially-
charged purposes. In particular, a for-pro¯t ¯rm may decide to be socially
responsible by opting for so called `corporate philanthropy', i.e. by regularly
¯nancing some nonpro¯t organizations via direct yearly donations to them (for
4example, by devoting to such bene¯ciary subjects a certain percentage of their
pro¯ts).
On the other hand, as far as nonpro¯t organizations are concerned, such
actors can either be truly `trustworthy' organizations, insofar as they actually
pursue their social mission over time in a consistent manner, or be `isomorphic'
organizations. The latter scenario occurs when such organizations, though re-
specting the classic non pro¯t distribution constraint, in fact do not give priority
to their social mission and, de facto, end up behaving like for-pro¯t ¯rms. Trust-
worthy nonpro¯ts can be seen as organizations which, thanks to their genuinely
and consistently mission-oriented identity, are capable of generating trust and
make this relevant resource available to the economic system as a whole. As
we argued above, trust can be seen as a `public good', that is as a good which
generates nonrival and nonexcludable bene¯ts, at least to a certain extent. It
is important to specify that even such organizations can raise funds by selling
goods and/or services on the market: what is crucial is that such activity has
to be clearly and unambiguously instrumental to the pursuit of their social mis-
sion. As Schi® and Weisbrod (1991) correctly point out, NPOs can operate on
the market, as for-pro¯ts do, despite \the negative utility provided to the (non-
pro¯t) managers by producing commercial output". Handy (1997) adds that
\NPs are willing to engage in limited pro¯t-maximizing commercial activities
simply in order to cross-subsidize their preferred nonpro¯t activities, leaving
any excess demand to be met by FPs". The point is that \FPs alter their be-
haviour in the face of economic changes outside the control of the consumer. For
example, an increase in the probability that a FP will stop operating (because
of adverse economic conditions, say) will reduce its supply of the unobserv-
able input to decrease costs. But such probabilities are not, in general, public
knowledge. Given the importance of the service in question, consumers who
are risk averse and/or have a strong preference for the unobservable input will
prefer NPs even if FPs have a good reputation and are more e±cient than NPs,
providing that FPs { due to changing market conditions { are known to act
opportunistically" (Handy 1997).2 But then, some may wonder, when does it
make sense to claim that some nonpro¯ts risk to become more and more similar
to FPOs and, therefore, to give birth to the worrying outcome that Weisbrod
(1998) labels as `mission displacement'? Such phenomenon occurs when NPOs,
while keeping on respecting a formal constraint such as the non pro¯t distribu-
tion constraint, risk in fact to lose their speci¯c mission-oriented identity and
not to produce trust anymore in favor of the economic system as a whole. As
Handy (1997) remarks, \It is increasingly recognized that the legal constraint
of `nondistribution' of pro¯ts is too `passive' to imply that NPs will be trusted.
Managers who cannot have access to pro¯ts may choose to distribute pro¯ts via
increased perquisites. This can provide NPs management with an incentive to
increase pro¯ts at the expense of the customer. And, of course, the manage-
2She also speci¯es that \FPs, it has been argued by Chillemi and Gui (1991), remain
trustworthy only when the price remains high enough for it to sustain its reputation and thus
cannot adequately respond to changing market conditions. This is not the case for NPs"
(Handy 1997).
5ment of a NP can always ensure that no pro¯ts are generated by combining the
exploitation of consumer ignorance (or positional weakness) with a low level of
work-related e®ort".
The problem is that nonpro¯t organizations operating too much on the mar-
ket risk to pave the way to a `commercialization' outcome (Weisbrod 1998), i.e.
to generate a trend characterized by excessive analogies between NPOs and
FPOs' behaviors. The most serious problem is that such trend may jeopardize
the ability of NPOs to give systematically priority to their mission, rather than
to the pro¯t motive. As Antoci, Sacco and Zarri (2004b) remark, \Nonpro¯ts
may rely, in principle, on multiple, distinct sources of funding: beside individual
donations, further signi¯cant channels are income from the sale of goods and/or
services, user fees and (direct and indirect) public subsidies. In the U.S., where
nonpro¯t revenues make up about 10% of the GNP, it is increasingly harder to
precisely de¯ne the boundaries between for-pro¯t and nonpro¯t sectors (Arrow
1998) and the essence of such phenomenon is well captured by Weisbrod (1998),
as he notices that nowadays \Many nonpro¯ts face increasing ¯nancial pressure
because the gap between their resources and what they see as social `need' is
growing. (...) `Need' is di±cult to de¯ne and measure, but if nonpro¯ts search
for new revenues, they have few choices: to increase private donations and/or
to increase income from the sale of goods or services { that is, `commercial' ac-
tivity". The problem is that if nonpro¯ts choose to mainly rely on user fees, i.e.
on revenues from the sale of goods or services on the market, they run the risk
to lose their speci¯c identity and not to di®erentiate themselves anymore from
for-pro¯t ¯rms, by ending up mimicking their status of private goods sellers and
pro¯t-oriented organizations. Commenting on this phenomenon, which seems
to be characteristic of the current phase of rapid growth of the nonpro¯t sector
in the U.S., Weisbrod (1998) points out that such trend may induce people to
perceive nonpro¯t organizations as `for-pro¯ts in disguise'. Therefore, as to the
issue of how to balance nonpro¯ts' pursuit of their institutional mission with
growing ¯nancial constraints, he argues that such organizations would be really
free to autonomously pursue their social missions only insofar as they were able
to rely on income from individual donations without being conditioned to any
speci¯c behavior in return. By contrast, if they mainly depended on either user
fees or subsidies by (local and/or national) Government, they would risk to be
forced to re-de¯ne their goals and, in the medium-long term, to lose their orig-
inal identity. Such compromising of mission in the interest of revenue has been
described as mission displacement (Weisbrod 1998).
2.1 Payo® Functions
How can we formalize the presence of the above described four sub-types of
private organizations in the economy? We decided to proceed as follows. Let
CFPO be the strategy `contribute to the funding of NPOs': we assume that the
for-pro¯t ¯rms choosing to contribute to the funding of NPOs are de facto `so-
cially responsible' ¯rms, due to their choice of corporate philanthropy. Let x(t)
6be the proportion of for-pro¯t ¯rms opting for CSR. Therefore, 1 ¸ x(t) ¸ 0
and 1 ¡ x(t) represents the proportion of `pure' for-pro¯ts, i.e. the proportion
of for-pro¯t ¯rms deciding not to contribute to the funding of non pro¯t orga-
nizations (by devoting a certain amount of their yearly pro¯ts to them) and to
adopt the strategy NCFPO.
As far as nonpro¯t organizations are concerned, we suppose that y(t) is
the proportion of NPOs which turn out to be actually trustworthy (TNPO) as
they prove to be substantially (and not only formally) mission-oriented, by
consistently pursuing their social mission. By contrast, 1 ¡ y(t) indicates the
proportion of organizations which can be formally labelled as NPOs due to the
fact that they respect the so called `Non Pro¯t Distribution Constraint', but that
cannot be considered as `proper' NPO due to their excessive tendency to mimic
the behavior of for-pro¯t ¯rms (which, as we pointed out in Section 2, risks to
give rise to a socially undesirable consequence such as `mission displacement').
For this reason, we qualify this type of nonpro¯t organizations as `isomorphic',
INPO. In this light, for-pro¯ts' and nonpro¯ts' payo® functions are formally
expressed as follows.
2.1.1 FPOs' Payo®s
The payo®s of for-pro¯t ¯rms (FPOs) are as follows. As far as for-pro¯t ¯rms
choosing CSR, i.e. to contribute to the funding of NPOs, CFPO
¼(CFPO) = ¡a + b1k + c1x
where the variable k captures the stock of a speci¯c form of social capital,
namely the institutionally produced generalized trust utilized by the economic
system. Furthermore:
1) The parameter a > 0 represents the (constant) component of their payo®
regarding the cost of contributing, i.e. the cost of their choice of corporate
philanthropy.
2) The parameter b1 > 0 captures the positive externality generated by k.
3) The parameter c1 captures the externality generated by x (the proportion
of FPOs choosing CSR). The parameter c1 may assume positive or negative
values, as it is possible that an increase in the proportion of `virtuous' FPOs
creates a competition among FPOs opting for CSR (rather than a positive
externality on all of them caused by each socially responsible ¯rm's indirect
contribution to the accumulation of trust). Therefore, we assume that c1 R 0.
As far as pure for-pro¯t ¯rms, i.e. for-pro¯ts choosing not to contribute to
the funding of NPOs, NCFPO
¼(NCFPO) = b2k + c2x
where:
7i) The parameter b2 > 0 measures the positive externality generated by k.
It seems reasonable to suppose that b2 · b1, as socially responsible for-pro¯ts
are likely to be better able to exploit the existing amount of trust, due to the
positive e®ect on their reputation and reliability (on the part of consumers)
which it seems plausible to attribute to the choice of CSR.
ii) The parameter c2 measures the externality generated by x (the propor-
tion of FPOs choosing CSR). Such parameter can be either positive or negative.
We can suppose c2 to be greater than zero insofar as we claim that FPOs adopt-
ing CSR are less competitive than pure FPOs (say, due to their need to charge
higher prices in order to make the costly adoption of CSR an economically viable
strategy). But the sign could be negative if we assume that, as forms of eth-
ical and responsible consumption spread over on the demand side, the market
rewards FPOs with CSR and that this e®ect counterbalances the loss in compet-
itiveness due to the cost of contributing to the funding of NPOs. In this regard,
Ian Davis, worldwide managing director of McKinsey & Company, in the 3 June
2005 issue of The Economist, observes that \Social pressures often indicate the
existence of unmet social needs or consumer preferences. Businesses can gain
advantage by spotting and supplying these before their competitors. Paradoxi-
cally, the language of shareholder value may hinder companies from maximising
shareholder value in this respect. Practised as an unthinking mantra, it can
lead managers to focus excessively on improving the short-term performance of
their business, neglecting important longer-term opportunities and issues. The
latter would include not just societal pressures, but also the trust of consumers,
investment in innovation and other growth prospects". This seems to be true, in
particular, with reference to the role of business in developing countries, where,
as Davis remarks, \If companies operating in such environments focus too nar-
rowly on ill-de¯ned local laws or shy from broad debates about their alleged
behaviour, they are likely to face mounting criticism over their activities, and
face a greater risk of becoming embroiled in local political tensions". Therefore,
we assume c2 R 0.
2.1.2 NPOs' Payo®s
The payo®s of nonpro¯t organizations (NPOs) are as follows. As far as `vir-
tuous' nonpro¯ts which are authentically mission-oriented are concerned, i.e.
`trustworthy' nonpro¯ts, TNPO
¼(TNPO) = i1x + l1y
where we assume that i1 is such that i1 > 0. We suppose further that
l1 R 0. In particular, we may have l1 < 0 when trustworthy nonpro¯ts end up
competing with each other in order to gain funds from FPOs.
As far as isomorphic nonpro¯ts are concerned, i.e. nonpro¯ts mimicking
for-pro¯t ¯rms' behavior on the market, which, as we previously recalled (on
8the basis of Weisbrod's analysis) are at risk of `mission displacement', we refer
to their strategy as to INPO and their payo® function is
¼(INPO) = m + i2x + l2y
We can interpret INPO as a `defensive' strategy that NPOs adopt only insofar
as they receive a low level of funding on the part of FPOs. In this light, we
assume that, for a given level of y, the di®erence between ¼(TNPO), obtained
through the strategy TNPO, and ¼(INPO), obtained through the strategy INPO,
increases as x increases. Such a property can be captured by assuming: m > 0,
i1 > i2 ¸ 0. For l2 we have l2 R 0. Further, we do not assume any speci¯c
relationship between l1 and l2. Finally, let us remark that a crucial di®erence
between FPOs' and NPOs' payo® function is that while k directly a®ects the
former, it has no impact on the latter: this is equivalent to assume that only for-
pro¯ts are `trust consumers', though asymmetries may exist between virtuous
and non-virtuous ones (as we will clarify in Section 5, by distinguishing among
three di®erent contexts). As far as `trust producers' are concerned, we deal with
this aspect in the next section.
2.2 Trust Accumulation
In the light of the considerations developed in the Introduction, let us assume
that the variable k captures the stock of a speci¯c form of social capital. In
particular, as anticipated before, we suppose that k is a stock variable measur-
ing the level of a peculiar `public good' for the economy such as the speci¯c
form of generalized trust directly produced by a `virtuous' behavior of both for-
pro¯t ¯rms (which act virtuously insofar as they decide to embrace CSR and,
therefore, to contribute to NPOs via corporate philanthropy) and nonpro¯t or-
ganizations (which act virtuously insofar as they are `trustworthy' rather than
`isomorphic', i.e. insofar as they are not only formally but also, and especially,
substantially nonpro¯t subjects). Therefore k is assumed to depend positively
on the proportion of both (a) socially responsible ¯rms and (b) trustworthy
nonpro¯t organizations present in the economy. In this light, we claim that the
dynamics of trust k can be plausibly described by the following equation
¢
k = ®(k ¡ k) ¡ ¯(1 ¡ x) ¡ ±(1 ¡ y)
where ®, k > 0 and ± > ¯ ¸ 0; k 2 R. The parameter k indicates the max-
imum level of generalized trust that the system can generate via institutional
channels (i.e. through NPOs-FPOs dynamic interaction), that is the highest
level of institutionally produced generalized trust our economy can achieve. As
we speci¯ed in Section 1, generalized trust can be produced not only via insti-
tutional channels but also via social interactions of informal groups (see on this
the classical sociological analysis developed by Robert Putnam on the determi-
nants of social capital accumulation and fall, with special reference to the United
9States (Putnam 2000)). The above equation implies that such level k cannot
be reached insofar as either a positive proportion of NPOs are isomorphic or a
positive proportion of FPOs are pure pro¯t-maximizing ¯rms (or both). The
idea is that the proportion of non-virtuous nonpro¯t organizations generate a
negative externality preventing k from reaching its limit value k. Whenever a
positive proportion of NPOs are isomorphic (a behavioral trend which appears
to be extremely signi¯cant empirically, both in the U.S. (see Weisbrod 1998) as
well as in the Italian (see Barbetta, Cima and Zamaro 2003) nonpro¯t sector
(though less clearly), such limit value cannot be reached. Analogously, also
the proportion of pure FPOs (the ones abstaining from the costly adoption of
CSR strategies), generate a negative externality, producing an e®ect that can
be compared to the one generated by the presence of isomorphic organizations
within the nonpro¯t sector. In principle, then, k = k is a feasible scenario only
insofar as x = y = 1, that is when all for-pro¯ts adopt CSR and all nonprof-
its are trustworthy. We may equivalently interpret the parameters ¯ and ± as
depreciation rates: as (institutionally produced) generalized trust is a form of
social capital - and social capital is a form of capital (though it possesses pe-
culiar features that make it qualitatively di®erent from more standard forms of
capital, such as natural or physical capital) - it is subject to depreciation over
time. In this case, since we are analyzing a socio-economic evolutionary process
where generalized trust is accumulated via NPOs-FPOs dynamic interaction, it
appears natural to suppose that the depreciation of k depends on the relevance
of `non-virtuous' behaviors in both the for-pro¯t and the nonpro¯t sector of
the economy. In this model we assume that ¯ < ±, in that it seems plausible to
suppose that virtuous (i.e. trustworthy) NPOs contribute more than virtuous
(i.e. socially responsible) FPOs to the accumulation of generalized trust in the
economy. Finally, let us observe that our formalization of the dynamics of trust
di®ers from the one chosen by other authors focusing on di®erent features of
social capital: for example, Antoci, Sacco and Vanin (2004) assume that social
capital increases when available social opportunities are e®ectively exploited
(that is, when people enjoy so called `relational goods', which are typically
time-consuming).3
3 Social Dynamics
The dynamic system we decided to analyze can then be written as
¢
k = ®(k ¡ k) ¡ ¯(1 ¡ x) ¡ ±(1 ¡ y)
_ x = x(1 ¡ x)[¼(CFPO) ¡ ¼(NCFPO)]
_ y = y(1 ¡ y)[¼(TNPO) ¡ ¼(INPO)]
(1)
with k 2 R, 0 · x · 1, 0 · y · 1 and where the ¯rst equation expresses trust
accumulation and the other two equations are replicator equations. Following
3By so doing, in their view of social capital they are closer \to an interpretation of social
capital in terms of evolution of customs and of social norms rather than in terms of construction
of associations and other social organizations" (Antoci, Sacco and Vanin 2004).
10Taylor and Jonker (1978) and Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988), we suppose that
the dynamics of x and y - that is the adoption process of strategies within the
economy - is driven by the so called replicator equations. Replicator dynamics
are a widely adopted model of social (as well as natural) selection dynamics
characterized by payo® monotonicity, i.e. the most rewarding strategies survive
and spread over within the community at the expense of the less successful ones
(see Antoci, Sacco and Zarri 2004a for an evolutionary, game-theoretic model
based on a similar formal structure). With regard to this selection dynamics,
Heckathorn (1996) points out that: \Based on the resulting payo®s, the actors
with the most successful strategies proliferate at the expense of the less success-
ful. This process is then repeated, generation after generation, until the system
either approaches stable equilibrium or cyclical variation. Biologists employ
these approaches to model evolutionary selection. However, the selection pro-
cess has also been interpreted as re°ecting a process of observational learning in
which actors compare their own outcomes to those of their peers, imitating peers
who do best (Brown et al. 1982; Boyd and Richerson 1985). In essence, actors
look around to see who is doing well and take as role models those who appear
most successful. When interpreted in this manner, these models can be termed
sideways-looking models of behavior" (italics added). Therefore, as far as this
speci¯c evolutionary model is concerned, we are assuming here that the rela-
tive frequencies of sub-types within each population (i.e. `pure' and `socially
responsible' FPOs within the for-pro¯t sector and `trustworthy' and `isomor-
phic' NPOs within the nonpro¯t sector) present in the economy are driven by
their relative performances within the strategic scenario under study: in such
a social learning process, the most rewarding strategies are imitated at the ex-
pense of non-successful ones (BjÄ ornerstedt and Weibull 1996 provide us with
some rigorous microfoundations).
We decided to analyze the dynamics of both k and the two types of pri-
vate organizations operating in the economic system as we maintain that the
evolution of generalized trust and the dynamics of NPOs and FPOs do con-
tinuously a®ect each other as time unfolds. This is equivalent to claim that a
co-evolutionary process takes place within a complex economic system: on the
one hand, as we have shown in the previous section, for-pro¯ts' payo® functions
depend directly on the level of k, as the higher the level of generalized trust in
the economy, the higher the individual bene¯t for such economic organizations4;
on the other hand, the evolution of k itself depends, in turn, on the proportions
of `virtuous' and `non-virtuous' (for-pro¯t and nonpro¯t) organizations acting
in the economy. Therefore, in equilibrium, k, x and y are endogenously co-
determined by the evolution of the above described trust accumulation and
replicator equations.
4Though the impact of k on pure and socially responsible payo® functions may di®er, as
we pointed out by assuming b2 · b1:
114 ANALYTICAL RESULTS
4.1 EQUILIBRIA










¡ ¯ (1 ¡ x) ¡ ± (1 ¡ y)
¢
x = x(1 ¡ x)(¡a + bk + cx)
¢
y = y(1 ¡ y)(¡m + ix + ly)
(2)
where: b := b1 ¡ b2 ¸ 0, c := c1 ¡ c2 Q 0, i := i1 ¡ i2 > 0, l := l1 ¡ l2 Q 0.






being such that, when k = k1,
¢
k > 0).
System (2) generically admits at most nine ¯xed points Pi = (ki;xi;yi),
i = 1;::;9: four ¯xed points in the vertices (P1;P2;P3;P4, always existing), four
¯xed points on the faces x = 0, 1 and y = 0, 1, and one interior ¯xed point
(P9). The situation is summed up by the following table
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9
k k1 k2 k3 k4 k5 k6 k7 k8 k9
x 0 1 0 1 x5 x6 0 1 x9
y 0 0 1 1 0 1 y7 y8 y9
where 0 < x5, x6, x9, y7, y8, y9 < 1.
What we can immediately observe from the table above is that P9 is the
only ¯xed point where all the four sub-types of private organizations are simul-
taneously present. By contrast Pi, i = 1;::;4; are pure population states where
only one type of FPOs and one type of NPOs survive (e.g. in P3 all FPOs are
`pure' for-pro¯ts while all NPOs are `trustworthy') whereas in correspondence
with Pi, i = 5;::;8; three sub-types of private organizations are there (e.g. in P5
all NPOs are `isomorphic' and coexist with positive proportions of both `pure'
and `socially responsible' FPOs).








xi(1 ¡ xi)b (1 ¡ 2xi)N + xi(1 ¡ xi)c 0








N = ¡a + bki + cxi and M = ¡m + ixi + lyi
Then, the following proposition can be easily checked.
Proposition 1 If b > 0, the ¯xed points P1 ¡P9 exist and are attractive if and
only if:
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, l > m;
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9. P9: c < 0, l < 0, ¯b + ®c < 0, l >
±ib
¯b + ®c











y do not depend on k. In such a context, if c · a, x approaches
0 whatever is the initial value x0 of x; if c > a, x approaches 0 if x0 < a=c and
1 if x0 > a=c. Consequently, no equilibrium with x 6= 0;1 can be attractive.
4.2 NO INTERIOR EQUILIBRIUM
Theorem 2 If no interior equilibrium exists, all the interior orbits tend to the
boundary.























A ¡ B (4)
where A is a third order quadratic matrix and B 2 R3.
Assume (4) has no equilibrium.
If detA = 0, it is easily seen that some suitable linear combination of k; u;
v is increasing (decreasing) with speed bounded away from zero on all the orbits
(so the original orbits of (2) tend to the boundary).



































So, if (k0;x0;y0) is not interior to ¦, one, at least, among the variables p;
q; r tends to in¯nity. Since the vector ¯eld on the faces k = k1;k points inside
¦, this means that either x or y (or both) tends to 0 or 1.
4.3 HOPF BIFURCATIONS




k + k1, and then pose
k0 = 1 ¡ k, x0 = 1 ¡ x, y0 = 1 ¡ y






k = ¡®k + ¯x + ±y
¢
x = x(1 ¡ x)(¡a + bk + cx)
¢
y = y(1 ¡ y)(¡m + ix + ly)
(6)
where the signs of the parameters ®, ¯, ±, b, c, i, l are the same as the
original ones and, further, ® > ¯ + ±:
Let us assume the system has a unique interior equilibrium P9 = (k9;x9;y9):
A necessary (and generically su±cient) condition for a Hopf bifurcation to
take place is that, at the equilibrium, two eigenvalues are imaginary conjugate.
14This means that the characteristic polynomial of J, the jacobian matrix,
must take the form













where we renamed as b, c, i, l respectively bx9 (1 ¡ x9), cx9 (1 ¡ x9), iy9 (1 ¡ y9),
ly9 (1 ¡ y9).
Hence
P(¸) = ¸3 ¡ tr(J)¸2 + H(J)¸ ¡ det(J) (9)
where
H(J) = ¡®(c + l) + cl ¡ b¯





det(J) = tr(J) ¢ H(J)
(10)
Straightforward computations show that conditions (10) are incompatible
with c, l < 0, which is a necessary condition for the attractiveness of P9:
Therefore, by recalling (10), it follows, in particular, that no attractive limit
cycle, arisen from a Hopf bifurcation, can exist.
However, Hopf bifurcations where a saddle-point (with two-dimensional sta-
ble manifold) becomes a repellor can exist.
For example, pose in (8)
® = 1, ¯ = 0, ± =
1
2
, b = 2, c = 2, i = 10, l = 3 (11)
Then conditions (10) are checked to hold (the same is true, of course, if we
take ¯ > 0 su±ciently small and let the other parameters vary accordingly). As
to the equilibrium, we can choose, for example, k9 = 1
4; x9 = y9 = 1
2:
4.4 NO CYCLE ON THE BOUNDARY
Theorem 3 On the invariant faces x = 0;1, y = 0;1 of the parallelepiped ¦
no cycle (i.e. non-trivial periodic orbit) exists.
Proof. Let us refer to the system written in form (6). Then ¦ = [0;1]
3.
Consider the invariant faces x = 0;1, y = 0;1 (when k = 0;1 and x;y 6= 0;1
the vector ¯eld points inside ¦).
15a) When x = 0;1, the system on the corresponding invariant rectangle, say
z, takes the form
( ¢
k = ¡®k + ±y + e ¯
¢
y = y(1 ¡ y)(¡e m + ly)
(12)
Hence along all non-trivial orbits y(t) either increases or decreases.
b) Let, now, y = 0;1 and consider on the corresponding invariant rectangle,
say z again, the system
( ¢
k = ¡®k + ¯x + e ±
¢
x = x(1 ¡ x)(¡a + bk + cx)
(13)
The case b = 0 is straightforward. Let us assume b > 0. If no interior
equilibrium exists, by the Poincar¶ e - Bendixson Theorem all the orbits tend
to the boundary. Suppose, viceversa, there exists an interior equilibrium P =
(k0;x0). We can suppose it to be unique, otherwise a segment of equilibria exists
and clearly no non-trivial orbit can be periodic.
By changing k into rk, with r =
q
¯
b, we can assume, after renaming the
parameters, b = ¯:
Hence, denoting the jacobian matrix at P as J,
sign(detJ) = sign(¡®c ¡ ¯2) 6= 0 (14)
If detJ < 0, P is a saddle-point and no cycle can surround it.
So, assume
¡®c ¡ ¯2 > 0 (15)
implying c < 0.
Posing u = ln x
1¡x; we can rewrite the system, in the interior of z, as
( ¢
k = ¡®(k ¡ k0) + ¯(x ¡ x0)
¢
u = b(k ¡ k0) + c(x ¡ x0)
(16)







¡ k0k + ln(eu + 1) ¡ x0u (17)
Then, along any orbit of (16),
d
dt
G(k;u) = ¡®(k ¡ k0)2 + 2¯(k ¡ k0)(x ¡ x0) + c(x ¡ x0)2 (18)
It follows from (15) that, along any non-trivial orbit of (16),
16d
dt
G(k;u) < 0 (19)





£ (¡1;+1), we observe




G(k;u) = +1; (20)
since 0 < x0 < 1.
This implies that G(k;u) is a Lyapunov function and that P is a global
attractor in the interior of the invariant rectangle z.
4.5 GLOBAL ATTRACTIVENESS OF P9






exists and is unique. Then, taking in the interior of ¦ coordinates
k; u = ln x
1¡x; v = ln
y
































Our goal is to give a su±cient condition for P9 to be globally attractive in
§ (i.e. in the interior of ¦).





(A + At) (23)
Then, if B is negative de¯nite, P9 is a global attractor in §.














17Hence it follows, through straightforward computations, that along every non-
trivial orbit of (21)
dG
dt
= ZtBZ < 0; (25)
if B is negative de¯nite.
By the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3, one can observe that
G(k;u;v) tends to +1 when u or/and v tend to §1, whereas the vector ¯eld
points inside § for k = k1;k.
Furthermore, suppose C is a compact non-trivial invariant set in §. There-
fore G has a minimum in C. However at a minimum point dG
dt < 0, thus
yielding a contradiction.
We can conclude that G(k;u;v) is a Lyapunov function and P9 is a global
attractor in §.
Remark It is not di±cult to prove that, under our assumptions, the above
condition `B is negative de¯nite' can be replaced by the weaker one `B is neg-
ative semi-de¯nite' (in fact, it is easily checked that, being A non-singular, no
line or plane through P9, in the (k;x;y) space, can be invariant).
5 Contexts
In this section we take a step further and make our analysis more speci¯c, by
explicitly inserting into the picture three distinct scenarios characterized by rel-
evant intra-organizational and/or inter-organizational asymmetries, that is be-
havioral asymmetries present either within one or both organizational types (i.e.
between trustworthy and isomorphic NPOs and/or pure and socially responsible
FPOs) or between NPOs and FPOs. In particular, we draw a distinction be-
tween `trust producers' and `trust consumers', by assuming that within a single
scenario only some of the organizations involved are able to produce generalized
trust and that, at the same time, only some of them (not necessarily coinciding
with the former) can be labelled as `consumers' of the trust provided by the for-
mer. In our view, considering such di®erences with regard to the provision and
consumption of an invisible but crucial public good such as generalized trust
makes the whole framework more realistic, in the light of several recent the-
oretical as well as empirical contributions focusing on the links between trust
production, trust consumption, CSR and nonpro¯t organizations' role within
advanced economies (see e.g. Weisbrod 1998; Becchetti, Federico and Solferino
2005; Sacco and Zamagni 2001). Needless to say, analyzing di®erent contexts
depending on the organizational nature of trust producers helps us shedding fur-
ther light on the notion of `institutionally produced generalized trust' which is
the speci¯c form of economically relevant social capital considered in our model.
The three contexts under study have been labelled as follows, with respect to
the features attributed to CSR in each of them: (A) Symmetry in Trust Con-
sumption. (B) Asymmetry in Trust Consumption without Competition E®ects.
(C) Asymmetry in Trust Consumption with Competition E®ects.
185.1 Context A. Symmetry in Trust Consumption
First we consider the following form of inter-organizational asymmetry (i.e. be-
tween nonpro¯t and for-pro¯t organizations), by assuming that, as far as NPOs
are concerned, only trustworthy NPOs are trust producers, whereas, on the de-
mand (of trust) side, FPOs only act as consumers of trust. In other words,
we are supposing here that trust is a crucial resource for the market to prop-
erly work, display its bene¯cial e®ects and be sustainable over time, but that
FPOs are not able to directly provide (and not even to partially contribute to
the provision of) such peculiar public good to the market economy they are
embedded in. By contrast, `true' mission-oriented organizations such as trust-
worthy NPOs can be reasonably seen as organizations endowed with the set of
pro-social goals as well as workers' and volunteers' intrinsic motivations (see e.g.
on this Mirvis 1992 and Leete 1999) that make them capable of contributing to
the provision of generalized trust (regardless of their ability to understand this
and measure this speci¯c form of positive externalities, for example by means
of proper social accountability tools). Analytically, this is equivalent to assume
that ¯ = 0, as now the accumulation of k is supposed to be positively a®ected
by the proportion of trustworthy NPOs but not by the proportion of socially
responsible FPOs present in the economy. As far as FPOs are concerned, we
suppose that a symmetry exists between pure and socially responsible for-pro¯ts
in terms of trust consumption, by assuming that b = 0 (which means that k has
the same impact on the two trust consumers' payo® functions). This symmetry
may be interpreted as follows: with regard to the demand side of the market,
consumers know that trust is important but also that only `virtuous' NPOs,
and not FPOs, do contribute to its accumulation; therefore, they decide not to
`reward' for-pro¯t ¯rms opting for CSR when they buy goods and/or services
on the market. In other words, we argue that consumers' behavior towards
for-pro¯ts may be plausibly related to the fact that such organizations are not
trust producers but only trust consumers, in a sense acting as `free riders' with
regard to trustworthy nonpro¯ts, with respect to trust consumption. As a con-
sequence, here CSR, far from acting as a competitive advantage factor, turns
out to be an ine®ective strategy for the ¯rms adopting it.
Within such context,
¢




y do not depend on k.
So, if c · a, x approaches 0 whatever the initial value x0 of x is; if c > a, x
approaches 0 if x0 < a=c and 1 if x0 > a=c. Consequently, no equilibrium with
x 6= 0;1 can be attractive.
Within the plane x = 0, the following dynamics can be observed:
a) If m ¸ l, then y ! 0 and k ! k ¡ ±=®;
b) If m < l, then y ! 0 and k ! k ¡±=® if the initial value y0 of y satis¯es
the condition y0 < m=l while y ! 1 and k ! k if y0 > m=l.
Within the plane x = 1, the following dynamics can be observed:
c) If m ¡ i ¸ max(0;l), then y ! 0 and k ! k ¡ ±=®;
d) If m ¡ i · min(0;l), then y ! 1 and k ! k;
19e) If 0 < m¡i < l, then y ! 0 and k ! k ¡±=® for y0 < (m¡i)=l while
y ! 1 and k ! k for y0 > (m ¡ i)=l ;
f) If 0 > m ¡ i > l, then y ! y8 = (m ¡ i)=l 2 (0;1) and k ! k8 =
k ¡ ±(1 ¡ y8)=® for every y0 6= 0;1.
Note that P1 is always attractive, regardless of the values assumed by c and
l: this means that for any combination of competitive pressures/cooperative
relations within for-pro¯t and nonpro¯t sector, a positive probability always
exists for convergence to occur on the `worst' social con¯guration where the level
of k is very low, all for-pro¯ts are pure FPOs and all nonpro¯ts are isomorphic
NPOs.
Furthermore, P4 can be attractive and this happens when both c and l are
high enough. However, whenever competitive pressures prevail either within the
nonpro¯t sector or within the for-pro¯t sector (or in both), then convergence
to the most desirable social outcome (where the level of trust is high and all
for-pro¯ts and nonpro¯ts present in the economy belong to the `virtuous' orga-
nizational sub-type) is ruled out. It is also interesting to remark that P1, P2, P3
and P4 can be all simultaneously attractive. In this context, it happens also that
P5, P6, P7 (coexistence among three sub-types) and P9 (coexistence among four
sub-types) can never be attractive, regardless of the values assumed by c and l.
In other words, this context is not favourable to the stable coexistence of more
than two sub-types at a time. The only exception is represented by P8, that can
be attractive under some conditions (conditions (f)). As an example, we can
consider the case showed in Figure 1, where continuous lines (respectively, dot-
ted lines) indicate attracting (respectively, non attracting) ¯xed points. Observe
that, for negative values of l and the speci¯ed values of the other parameters,
P1 and P8 can be simultaneously attractive ¯xed points.
We can also notice that, since b = 0, whenever c · a (competition e®ects
prevailing in the for-pro¯t sector), only the ¯xed points P1 and P3 can be at-
tractive. This means that in such context, where consumers do not reward for-
pro¯ts choosing CSR, if competition e®ects prevail within the for-pro¯t sector,
then no attractive ¯xed points with a positive proportion of socially responsible
for-pro¯ts can emerge. In such context, where only trustworthy nonpro¯t orga-
nizations are assumed to be trust producers whereas the two sub-types of FPOs
are symmetrically trust consumers, CSR turns out to be only a cost, rather
than a competitive advantage factor (as it does not a®ect consumers' choices),
so that being pure FPOs pays o® more than being socially responsible. The
sub-case c · a and l · m, in which only P1 is attractive, brings about a social
context where history does not matter and, regardless of initial conditions, so-
ciety converges to the `unpleasant' and economically unsustainable x = y = 0
equilibrium.
If in the context b = 0 we assume that both `virtuous' NPOs and `virtuous'









y do not depend on k). Though (ceteris paribus) in the former context the






























Figure 1: Scenario A1 e A3, with parameters: ® = 3, ¯ = 0, ± = 30, a = 3,
b = 0, c = 5, m = 2, i = 4, l = 5, k = 5
value of
¢
k is lower than in the latter (for x < 1), a lower k-accumulation has
no feed-back e®ect on the evolution of x and y and, consequently, on the ¯xed
point values of x and y.
5.2 Context B. Asymmetry in Trust Consumption with-
out Competition E®ects
In this section we assume b > 0, i.e. that, with respect to pure for-pro¯ts,
socially responsible ¯rms are better able to exploit k thanks to the higher rep-
utation level they have in front of consumers, as a direct consequence of their
strategic choice of Corporate Social Responsibility. In other words, it appears
plausible to suppose that a given stock of institutionally produced generalized
trust k (provided by trustworthy NPOs) displays a di®erent e®ect on pure and
socially responsible FPOs' payo® functions. This is the scenario that those who
believe in CSR are particularly interested in analyzing as we are able to study
what happens when it is the case that consumers attribute a positive value to
21CSR and `reward' socially responsible ¯rms through their consumption choices,
by properly acknowledging their positive role in enhancing the level of trust in
the economy as a whole (insofar as we suppose that CSR is commonly known
and observable, as it is often the case, and that its adoption indirectly favors
trust accumulation, i.e. ¯ > 0). In other words, consumers can be assumed
to be both informed (about the di®erent e®ects of for-pro¯ts' strategies on the
dynamics of trust) and consistent in their market behavior: when such `post-
industrial' economic agents buy goods and services, they do not simply compare
the options available by considering their price and physical quality, but are also
sensitive to immaterial assets such as the contributions provided by the ¯rms
producing those goods with regard to the accumulation of trust in the economy,
as they are aware of the importance of such intangible resource for the market
economy to work e±ciently and be sustainable over time. As Becchetti, Fed-
erico and Solferino (2005) maintain, by re°ecting on the post-industrial turn
occurring on the demand side of the market (and, consequently, on its dynamic
e®ects on the supply side), \the ongoing process of globalisation and economic
integration generated by the integration of electronics and telecommunications
has reduced distances among di®erent cultures. This phenomenon has increased
interdependence among countries and enhanced issues related to the provision
of global public goods. As a consequence, the sensitiveness of the public opinion
toward ethical issues such as the preservation of the environment and the ¯ght
to poverty in less developed countries is getting higher than before. This in-
creased awareness has generated a series of `grassroot' welfare initiatives which
focus on socially responsible (or socially concerned) saving and consumption".
Here CSR acts as a competitive advantage factor in favor of those FPOs which
have decided to lucidly `invest' in an intangible asset such as corporate identity:
the point is that such investment is particularly rewarding right within a social
context where consumers, far from interacting generically with any for-pro¯t
¯rm providing a given good or service, are ready to buy the good or service
they search by selectively rewarding those for-pro¯ts which seem to have in-
vested more in setting up a credible socially responsible corporate pro¯le. The
fact that CSR is costly in the short run and that such information is common
knowledge among the di®erent actors of the economy may then be seen as a
su±cient guarantee inducing such `post-industrial' consumers to reward such
¯rms and to buy goods there, rather than searching for pure FPOs operating
within the same market.
In order to make the analysis more complete, we explore both the case in
which socially responsible ¯rms do actually, though indirectly, contribute to the
accumulation of trust (¯ > 0) and the case in which they do not contribute (not
even indirectly) to such dynamics (¯ = 0).
In this section, we analyze the dynamics of the above described scenario
under the further assumption that both c ¸ 0 and l ¸ 0, i.e. by assuming that
competition does not prevail within neither sector. Note that, if c < 0, then the
FPOs being `socially responsible' would generate a negative externality on FPOs
belonging to the same `virtuous' sub-type. By contrast, if c > 0, self-enforcing
e®ects characterizing the dynamics of x prevail. Similarly, if l < 0, `trustworthy'
22NPOs would generate a negative externality on the NPOs belonging to the same
`virtuous' sub-type; if l > 0, self-enforcing e®ects characterizing the dynamics of
y prevail. The negative externality in the nonpro¯t sector can be explained if we
think of e®ects due to competition as far as fund-raising e®orts are concerned
(let us further recall that the sign of parameters c and l represents the `sum' of
positive and negative externalities and that the fact that the sign is positive or
negative depends on which of such e®ects does prevail). The negative externality
in the for-pro¯t sector can be explained if we think of standard competition
e®ects prevailing among FPOs.
In this context, according to Proposition 1, we have that the coexistence
¯xed points P5¡ P9, where three or four organizational sub-types coexist, can
never be attractive. This means that whenever positive externalities prevail both
within the nonpro¯t and the for-pro¯t sector, no more than two organizational
sub-types will survive in the medium-long run. As to the vertices Pi, i = 1;::;4,
one can wonder whether they can be simultaneously attractive. The answer is
















In Figure 2 we show a scenario where the above inequalities hold.
Furthermore, let us observe that, in Context B, the ¯xed point P1 may be
non-attractive (which is the case if k is high enough), unlike what happens in
Context A.
Figure 2 shows a scenario in which history, that is the initial values of x,
y and k, plays a crucial role in determining the outcome of social dynamics;
each equilibrium Pi, i = 1;::;4 can be interpreted as a social convention that
the economy can reach whenever economic interactions start su±ciently close
to it; economies with identical payo® functions can reach di®erent outcomes
starting from di®erent initial sub-type distributions, x and y, and a di®erent
trust accumulation level k.
In Figure 3, a numerical exercise is worked out to show how the dynamics
represented in Figure 2 changes if we let the parameter b vary in the interval
[0;4], with the remaining parameters being kept ¯xed at the values of Figure
2. This exercise shows what happens if the degree of asymmetry between vir-
tuous NPOs and pure FPOs (in taking advantage from the accumulation of k)
increases.
Figure 4 shows how the dynamics represented in Figure 2 changes if the
parameter ¯ varies in the interval [0;19], with the remaining parameters being
¯xed at the values of Figure 2. This simulation aims at describing how the
scenario illustrated in Figure 2 gets modi¯ed by an increase in the relevance
of virtuous NPOs as trust producers in the k-accumulation process.
5.3 Context C. Asymmetry in Trust Consumption with
Competition E®ects
In this section we keep on assuming, like in Context B, that b > 0, i.e. that,

































Figure 2: Fixed points P1¡P4 simultaneously attractive, with parameters:® = 3,
¯ = 15, ± = 20, a = 3, b = 1, c = 5, m = 4, i = 2, l = 5, k = 7
exploit k thanks to the higher reputation level they have in front of consumers
due to their strategic choice of CSR. However, unlike in Context B, we suppose
that here either c < 0 or l < 0 (or both), i.e. that competition occurs either
within the for-pro¯t sector or within the nonpro¯t one (or in both).
In Context C, the coexistence ¯xed points P5, P6, P8 and P9 can be at-
tractive; in particular, from Proposition 1, we can observe that necessary
condition for P5 and P6 to be attractive is that c < 0, i.e. that the FPOs being
`socially responsible' generate a negative externality on FPOs belonging to the
same `virtuous' sub-type (let us recall that in P5 we have 0 < x < 1, and that,
therefore, the two alternative strategies coexist within the for-pro¯t sector). By
contrast, if c > 0, self-enforcing e®ects characterizing the dynamics of x prevail
ruling out the coexistence between the two sub-types.
Furthermore, in order for the point P8 to be attractive, it is necessary that
l < 0, that is that the `trustworthy' NPOs generate a negative externality on the
NPOs belonging to the same `virtuous' sub-type (let us recall that in P8 we have
0 < y < 1, and that, therefore, the two alternative strategies that NPOs can
adopt coexist within the nonpro¯t sector). As we pointed out before, a negative
externality can be explained if we think of e®ects due to competition as far as































Figure 3: Parameters kept ¯xed at the values of Figure 2, but with 0 · b · 9
fund-raising e®orts are concerned. If l > 0, self-enforcing e®ects characterizing
the dynamics of y prevail.
By Proposition 1, we can also see that:
a) P3 (where x = 0 and y = 1) is never attractive if l < 0.
b) P7 (where x = 0 and 0 < y < 1) is never attractive.
c) P1 (where x = 0 and y = 0) and P5 (where 0 < x < 1 and y = 0) are
never simultaneously attractive.
d) P2 (where x = 1 and y = 0) and P4 (where x = 1 and y = 1) are never
simultaneously attractive if l < 0.
e) P3 (where x = 0 and y = 1) and P6 (where 0 < x < 1 and y = 1) are
never simultaneously attractive.
With regard to the existence of coexistence ¯xed points, it is easy to check
that the ¯xed points P5 ¡ P8 exist only if the value of the maximum level of
institutionally produced generalized trust k is neither too high nor too low.
The ¯xed point P9, where all four sub-types of private organizations present
in the economy coexist, can be attractive only if c < 0 and l < 0. That is,
P9 can be attractive only if the `virtuous' organizations operating in the two































Figure 4: Parameters kept ¯xed at the values of Figure 2, but with 0 · ¯ · 19
sectors generate negative externalities on the organizations belonging to the








®(i(a ¡ bk) ¡ cm) ¡ b¯(m ¡ i) + ±bi
¡®cl ¡ ¯bl + ±bi
Let us observe that, if b 6= 0, for k high enough, the value of y9 becomes
greater than 1 or lower than 0; therefore, the interior ¯xed point P9 does not
exist. Consequently, all coexistence ¯xed points P5 ¡P9 do not exist if, ceteris
paribus, the value of the maximum level of institutionally produced generalized
trust k is either high or low enough.
Figure 5 illustrates the dynamics with a parameter speci¯cation satisfying
P9 global attractiveness conditions of Theorem 4; this context is characterized
26by the fact that history (i. e. the starting point of dynamics) a®ects transi-
tion dynamics only, whereas it has no in°uence on the ¯nal outcome of social
dynamics, which is always P9. In this context, the economy cannot reach the
undesirable scenario P1; however, it can neither reach the outcome P4, where
























Figure 5: Interior ¯xed point P9, with parameters: ® = 30, ¯ = 1, ± = 1:5,
a = 5, b = 3, c = ¡38, m = 4, i = 7, l = ¡1, k = 10
Figure 6 shows how the dynamics represented in Figure 5 gets modi¯ed by
letting the parameter b vary in the interval [0;5], with the remaining parameters
being kept ¯xed at the values of Figure 5.
Since all the coexistence ¯xed points P5 ¡ P9 exist only if the value of the
maximum level of institutionally produced generalized trust k is neither too
high nor too low, the coexistence outcomes which characterize Context C can
be observed for `intermediate' values of k only; otherwise, only the ¯xed points
P1 ¡ P4 can be reached. Figure 7 shows how the dynamics represented in
Figure 5 gets modi¯ed by variations of the parameter k in the interval [5;15],
with the remaining parameters being kept ¯xed at the values of Figure 5.































Figure 6: Parameters kept ¯xed at the values of Figure 5, but with 0 · b · 5
6 Concluding Remarks
For-pro¯ts and nonpro¯ts represent the two types of private organizations oper-
ating within contemporary advanced economic systems. In this light, we thought
it was extremely important to study the conditions under which such economic
institutions, by dynamically interacting over time, are capable of producing an
economically vital form of social capital such as generalized trust. As we ar-
gued in the introductory section, by recalling several classical and recent studies
on the link between market economy and pre-market social values, generalized
trust acts as a public good playing a critical role for the functioning as well
as the long-term sustainability of market forces. When the level of trust is
eccessively low, the market mechanism cannot work properly and its founda-
tions are weak. In the history of economic thought, the strand of literature
focusing on the `magic' transformation of private `vices' into public `virtues'
(see also Mandeville's fable of the bees) adopted the view according to which
relying on individual's self-interest (private vices) was a su±cient guarantee for
the achievement of widespread well-being or the common good (public virtues).
































Figure 7: Parameters kept ¯xed at the values of Figure 5, but with 5 · k · 15
If this were true, people could live happily within society even if they had no
direct positive relationships with each other: altruism and other pro-social moti-
vations (and, therefore, also expectations of other persons' help and generosity)
would turn out to be completely unnecessary for the successful pursuit of social
well-being. Thanks to the invisible hand, every one would be free to simply
pursue his own self-interest, without worrying about others' goals and needs.
But is this a sound view not only in anthropological terms but also about how
successful economies and societies really work? Are we sure that agents' consis-
tent pursuit of their self-interest is su±cient for the achievement of important
social goals such as collective well-being and sustainability of both social and
economic institutions over time? The problem is that a rigorously individual-
istic interpretation of Smith's, Mandeville's and other classic scholars' writings
does not consider the possibility of tragic `dynamic paradoxes' that may arise
as a consequence of such anthropological perspective: insofar as people are only
seen as sel¯sh utility maximizers, economic and social interaction gradually ends
up eroding the so called `bond of society', i.e. that invisible but decisive social
network of values and informal norms that represents the real `cement' of soci-
29eties, that is that set of principles on the basis of which societies cohere (see on
this Elster 1989). When such crucial form of social capital gets eroded, mar-
kets themselves are less and less capable of producing their socially bene¯cial
e®ects and even of existing over time.5 Analogously, Axelrod (1986) observes
that \Economists are becoming interested in the origin and operation of norms
as they have come to realize that markets involve a great deal of behavior based
on standards that no one individual can determine alone". On the same vein,
Vaggi (1991) a±rms: \To exist societies need consensus on some general laws
and rules of behaviour, human society requires compliance and respect for so-
cial norms, which have emerged from the observance of the mutual behaviour
of its members. Indeed these rules and norms are the core and the very essence
of human societies. The market itself is a system of rules, of relationships, of
customs, and even of beliefs and of personal dispositions, whose formation may
take centuries".6
In the light of all these considerations on the connections between values and
market institutions, the lack of trust in the economy may be seen as a fundamen-
tal form of `market failure': markets do need trust (they are `trust consumers'),
but, at the same time, it is unclear if and how they can autonomously generate
the type and amount of trust they need in order to work e±ciently. In other
words, while markets can certainly be regarded as very good `trust consumers',
we do not know whether they can also be considered as e±cient `trust produc-
ers'. Sociologists have shown that trust can emerge out of several non-economic
forms of social interaction, such as the activity of various informal groups ac-
tive at the civil society level. While this type of analysis is undoubtedly of
great interest and relevance, we claim that it would be extremely important
for economists to understand whether our economic systems can generate au-
tonomously - through the endogenous activation of virtuous, trust-generating
mechanisms - a certain, relatively high and stable level of generalized trust. In
other words, we believe that it would be interesting to see whether contempo-
rary, complex market economies are sustainable and self-enforcing not only in
strictly material terms but also from this fundamental (though non-material)
5As Sacco and Zarri (2002) point out, \It would be hardly deniable that market economies
do have all the necessary potential to achieve signi¯cant results in terms of e±ciency, as well
as to create sustainable economic institutions. However, neither of these factors (e±ciency
and stability) lends itself to be analyzed from a purely non-historical perspective. By contrast,
they both crucially depend on evolutionary processes closely related to the culturally-speci¯c
reference context. Economic systems do not develop in a sort of vacuum closed to any non-
economic in°uence, but, on the contrary, seem to be embedded within dense social networks
where interpersonal relations, values and institutions interplay and a®ect both their structural
features as well as the performance levels they can reach".
6Market institutions also call for the existence of non-market institutions generating speci¯c
values which are crucial for the existence and stability of market organizations: \Market
exchange per se cannot bring about e±cient pro-social interaction, but rather requires it as a
precondition for optimal functioning. (...) In this vein, it is important to keep in mind that
market systems are compatible with many cultures de¯ned as tractable patterns of behaviour.
In turn, the degree of compatibility of market systems with cultures is not without e®ects
upon the global e±ciency of the systems themselves. Thus, one should expect that a culture
of individualism will produce di®erent results, in welfare terms, from a culture of reciprocity"
(Sacco and Zamagni 2001).
30viewpoint, i.e. with respect to the capability to endogenously generate the
amount of trust that they need in order to work e±ciently as time unfolds. In
the attempt to provide some preliminary answers to such complex questions,
the dynamic analysis illustrated in the previous sections has shown, in line with
similar models on the evolution of pro-social behaviors (see e.g. Antoci, Sacco
and Vanin 2004 and Antoci, Sacco and Zarri 2004a, b), that history matters:
in this model, initial conditions are often critical in order to understand where
the economic system will converge in the medium-long run, as to the level of
institutionally produced generalized trust k and the proportions of `virtuous'
FPOs (x) and NPOs (y).
More speci¯cally, we have shown that Context A (where b = 0, i.e. k has
the same impact on the two trust consumers' payo® functions) has the follow-
ing features. The ¯xed point P1 is always attractive, regardless of the values
assumed by c, l and k: this means that for any combination between compet-
itive pressures/cooperative relations within for-pro¯t and nonpro¯t sector, a
positive probability always exists for convergence to occur on the `worst' social
con¯guration where the level of k is very low, all for-pro¯ts are pure FPOs and
all nonpro¯ts are isomorphic ones; further, convergence to the most desirable
social outcome P4 (where the level of trust is high and all for-pro¯ts and non-
pro¯ts present in the economy belong to the `virtuous' organizational sub-type)
is possible if both c and l are high enough; the ¯xed points P1, P2, P3 and
P4 can be simultaneously attractive; the ¯xed points P5, P6, P7 (coexistence
among three sub-types) and P9 (coexistence among four sub-types) are never
attractive, regardless of the values assumed by c and l. In other words, this
context is not favorable to the stable coexistence of more than two sub-types at
a time. The only exception is represented by P8, that can be attractive under
some conditions.
We have also seen that, if b = 0, whenever c · a, only the ¯xed points P1
and P3 can be attractive. This means that in such context, where consumers
do not reward for-pro¯ts choosing CSR, if competition e®ects prevail in the
for-pro¯t sector, then no attractive ¯xed points with a positive proportion of
socially responsible for-pro¯ts can emerge. The sub-case c · a and l · m, in
which only P1 is attractive, brings about a social context where history does not
matter and, regardless of initial conditions, society converges to the `unpleasant'
and economically unsustainable x = y = 0 equilibrium.
As far as a socio-economic scenario such as P1 is concerned, we can observe
that this social con¯guration seems to recall, to some extent, what several schol-
ars depict as a trend currently occurring in the United States: in P1 the stock of
social capital is low and all nonpro¯ts are `isomorphic'; these two features seem
to characterize the current phase of socio-economic development in the U.S., as,
according to Putnam (2000), the last decades are characterized by a decline in
the stock of social capital and, according to Weisbrod (1998), the American non
pro¯t sector is more and more `commercial'. As Antoci, Sacco and Zarri (2004b)
observe, by referring to Weisbrod's analysis, \This is why the growing tendency,
in the U.S., for nonpro¯ts to receive less and less support in the form of private
donations (with a fall in their relative importance as a source of funding from
3153% to 24% in less than thirty years) and to conversely obtain more and more
of their income from the sale of goods and services on the market sounds as a
somewhat worrying perspective to many observers".
In Context B (b > 0, c and l ¸ 0, i.e. socially responsible for-pro¯ts are
better able to exploit k and no competition e®ects prevail neither within for-
pro¯t nor within nonpro¯t sector), we have shown that the coexistence ¯xed
points P5¡ P9 are never attractive. This means that whenever positive ex-
ternalities prevail both within the nonpro¯t and the for-pro¯t sector, no more
than two organizational sub-types will survive in the medium-long run. As to
the vertices Pi, i = 1;::;4, they can be simultaneously attractive (Figure 2);
in such case, history, that is the initial values of x, y and k, plays a key role
in determining the outcome of social dynamics; each equilibrium Pi, i = 1;::;4
can be interpreted as a social convention that the economy can reach insofar
as it starts su±ciently close to it; economies with identical payo® functions can
reach di®erent outcomes starting from di®erent initial sub-type distributions,
x and y, and a di®erent trust accumulation level k. The interesting feature
of the context depicted in Figure 2 is that the system can reach the socially
desiderable outcome P4 by any coordination device letting the economy start
from an initial position near enough to P4; when P4 is reached, then no public
intervention is necessary to maintain the economy in P4, in that it is locally
attractive.
In Context C ( b > 0 > c, l), we have shown that the coexistence ¯xed
points P5, P6, P8 and P9 can be attractive; in particular, a necessary condition
for P5 and P6 to be attractive is that c < 0, i.e. that the FPOs being `socially
responsible' generate a negative externality on FPOs belonging to the same
`virtuous' sub-type. Furthermore, in order for the point P8 to be attractive, it
is necessary that l < 0, that is that the `trustworthy' NPOs generate a negative
externality on the NPOs belonging to the same `virtuous' sub-type. The ¯xed
point P9 can be attractive only if the `virtuous' organizations operating in the
two sectors generate negative externalities on the organizations belonging to the
same sub-type.
With regard to the existence of coexistence ¯xed points, they emerge only
if the value of the maximum level of institutionally produced generalized trust
k is neither too high nor too low. So, intermediate values of k favor coexistence
among organizational sub-types in Context C, while favoring the regime in
which P1 ¡ P4 are simultaneously attractive (Figure 2) in Context B. For
high or low enough values of k, only the pure population ¯xed points P1 ¡ P4
can be reached by social dynamics in both Contexts B and C.
From a strictly analytical point of view, we have provided necessary and
su±cient conditions for the attractiveness of the ¯xed points and a su±cient
condition for global attractivity of the coexistence ¯xed point P9. We have
shown that if P9 does not exist, then orbits approach the boundary of the phase
space and no periodic orbit can exist in the planes x = 0, 1 and y = 0, 1.
Furthermore, we have proved that no attracting limit cycle can be generated by
a Hopf bifurcation.
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